Right!! First one. The Battle of the Coral Sea.

This excerpt comes from a book called "Pacific Partners" by Tom Frame.

Pacific Partners
An Australian perspective of USN RAN Naval relations
Bonded by Fire,1942
MAY 1942 marked a turning point in the national histories of both Australia and America. For Australia it was additionally
significant because for the first time in its history, the sovereignty of the Australian continent was under threat. The speed of the Japanese southward thrust through South East Asia and the Pacific after Pearl Harbour was unparalleled in history. Within three weeks of Pearl Harbour, the war front was less than 1000 miles from Darwin. Hong Kong had fallen, the battle-ship HMS Prince of Wales and the battle-cruiser HMS Repulse which were sent to deter the Japanese from attacking the Malay Peninsula were sunk; Thailand, Malaya and the Philippines had been invaded. Singapore had been taken and with it the 8th Division of the Second Australian Infantry Force.
The Dutch East Indies were next to fall while the Japanese landed on New Guinea and New Britain. Darwin was bombed and the war came to Australia. Japan held vast areas of land but, more importantly, had begun to exert control over the Pacific and Indian Ocean basins from the archipelagic strait between them. It seemed that nothing would stand against the Japanese Navy and Army. Australia was prepared to do all that it could. Australian troops were recalled from Europe. New aircraft would he built in Australia which would retain the aircrews who were training. The RAN had already suffered losses in the Mediterranean. The combined Allied naval effort in the Pacific was the victim of insufficient co-operation in peacetime and it was poorly organised for the first few months of 1942. There was a sense of  'despondency among the Allies as Japan had achieved its objectives with devastating efficiency. 
An operation was needed to boost morale, and highlight some vulnerability in the Japanese war machine. The 'Doolittle Raid' on Tokyo was to meet that need. A squadron of sixteen US Army Air Force B-25 bombers, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle, would be 1aunched from the carrier USS Hornet from a position 500 miles to the cast of the Japanese Home Islands. This task would have been virtually suicidal for the American carriers if they had shorter range, conventional carrier-borne aircraft. The task of launching the heavy B-25 bomber, normally a land-based aircraft, from a carrier was considered a great risk but with exhaustive training and practice, the pilots of Doolittle's squadron were airborne within 61 minutes. On 18 April 1942, they bombed a series of targets in Japan before escaping to safety in China while Hornet and Enterprise, the latter providing fighter support for Hornet, withdrew to the east. The psychological effect of the raid on the Japanese was enormous and led to several bad strategic decisions on their part over the ensuing two months. Recognising that the Japanese Navy had to bring the US Navy to a decisive engagement, the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto, planned an attack on the major American naval base at Midway Island. He believed that this would draw the Americans into the decisive battle he sought. The victory he envisaged at Midway would secure command of the seas for Japan and allow it to consolidate its gains. The Doolittle Raid, which made plain the offensive importance of carriers to the overall Allied position, led to the acceptance of Yamamoto's plan, code-named 'MI" But before this plan was executed employing the greatest naval force Japan could commit to Midway, New Guinea needed to he completely cleared of Allied forces with the capture of Port Moresby. This latter plan, code-named 'MO' would be executed simultaneously with an attack on the Solomon Islands to enhance the Japanese position in the South-West Pacific. Although the Japanese carrier strength available for 'MO' was limited to Shokaku and Zuikaku, and the light carrier Shoho, Yamamoto was confident that the element of surprise he had enjoyed at Pearl Harbour would he sufficient to ensure that 'MO' would he likewise successful. This was also preferred to a cross-country march from the northern coast of New Guinea which the Japanese already held. Two important points need to he made in relation to Plan 'MO' The first is that Japan expected to succeed. Secondly, the Japanese had not intended to invade or occupy Australia. An assessment prepared by the Japanese Imperial General Staff in 1942 explained the reasons.

"If the invasion is attempted, the Australians, in view of their national character, would resist to the end. Also because the geographic conditions of Australia present numerous difficulties in a military sense, it is apparent that a military venture in that country would be a difficult one. To alter the plan already in force, and to employ a force larger than the one employed in the southern area since the outbreak of the war, to suddenly invade Australia which lies 4000 nautical miles away would be a reckless adventure, and is beyond Japan's ability."


It is for this reason that Japan sought to capture New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa, and to establish a seaplane base in the Louisiade Archipelago - 150 miles south east of the 'tail' of New Guinea. The fact that the Japanese did not intend to invade Australia is immaterial to any overall assessment of the strategic For the first time in the war, good fortune was with the Allies. Having broken the Japanese naval communications codes and anticipating a possible thrust towards Port Moresby and Australia, two Allied Carrier Task Forces and a Cruiser Striking Force were concentrated in the Coral Sea-New Hebrides area. It was now the Allies who enjoyed the element of surprise while the Japanese relied on intelligence which, reported that only the carrier Saratoga was able to mount a counter-attack. In fact, Saratoga was completing a refit at Puget Sound, 7800 miles from Noumea. 

On 3 May 1942, the Allies received intelligence that the Japanese were landing at Tulagi Harbour in the Solomon Islands. Meanwhile, the Japanese Covering Group, under Rear Admiral Goto, and the Support Force, commanded by Rear Admiral Marushige, sailed for the Jomard Passage and entry into the Coral Sea. In company with the Port Moresby Invasion Group commanded by Rear Admiral Kajioke, the whole group would subsequently alter course to the west and start the offensive against Port Moresby. If Saratoga did attempt to offer resistance, the two carriers of Vice Admiral Takagi's Carrier Striking Force would converge on the American carrier and launch an attack with fighter aircraft. Operation 'MO', entrusted to the Japanese 4th Fleet and a collection of units gathered from the Dutch East Indies and the Indian Ocean, had commenced with Vice Admiral Inouye in command. 

Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inouye IJN commanded the Japanese forces from his flagship, the cruiser Kashima, which was in Rahaul. At the time of the Coral Sea Battle he was simultaneously in command of the Japanese 4th Fleet and the South Seas Force. Inouye, also known as Seihi lnouye, graduated from the Imperial Naval Academy in 1909 placed second in his class of 179 students. After training at sea and ashore, Inouye's superior analytical skills saw him preferred in promotion and a leading contender for high naval rank. An adviser to Navy Minister Admiral Kato at the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference in 1921, Inouye served as Japanese Naval Attache in Rome from 1927 to 1930 and thereafter became a leading adviser on Japan's international naval policy.He held a number of important positions prior to the outbreak of war: Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs (1937-39) and Chief of the Naval Aviation Department (1940-41). He was promoted Vice Admiral in 1939. 

It was during his time as chief of naval aviation that Inouye, an outspoken proponent of naval aviation, predicted that the Americans would employ an island-hopping strategy in any war against Japan and this led him to advocate a significant build-up of Japanese naval air power, rather than its surface fleet capability. His report went largely unnoticed. Although considered a pro-peace, even pacifist, admiral and a possible candidate as Navy Minister in 1941, Inouye later stated that he had not positively opposed the commencement of hostilities as the pro-war faction would have resisted his appointment.There is no doubt that Inouye was a brilliant administrator and staff officer, but his ability to exercise command at sea was suspect. Taking command of the 4th Fleet based at Truk, lnouye was given the task of capturing Guam and Wake Islands. The former was weakly defended so it was essentially a formality. The latter, however, had been strengthened during 1941. When Inouye encountered firmer resistance than he anticipated, his ships retired to the west and could have been destroyed while returning to Kwajalein. With the support of forces returning from Pearl Harbor, Inouye was finally successful. However, his invasion fleet had been the only force that had not achieved its initial objective.In April 1942, Inouye transferred his base from Truk to Rabaul in preparation for Operation 'MO' during which he would exercise overall command.Opposing Inouye in the Coral Sea was Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher USN, the commander of Allied Task Force 17. 

Fletcher had considerable naval command experience by the time of this command. A surface ships line officer, Fletcher first served on the Atlantic Fleet battleships Rhode Island, Ohio and Maine. After a period of service in the Philippines where he was appointed to his first command in 1912, the destroyer Chauncey, Fletcher returned to the Atlantic as Flag Lieutenant to his uncle who was Commander of the Fleet with his Flag in the battleships New York and then Wyoming. After several years on the staff of the US Naval Academy, he commanded the patrol boat Margaret and the destroyer Benham. Following a shore staff posting in the Bureau of Navigation, the then Commander Fletcher was posted in 1923 to the Asiatic Fleet in command of the destroyer Whople and the gunboat Sacramento. After another shore posting, Fletcher returned to sea as Executive Officer of the battleship Colorado. As an officer destined for high command in the US Navy, Fletcher was sent to both the Naval and Army War Colleges following which he served as a senior naval staff officer and as aide to Secretary of the Navy, Claude Swanson. In 1936, Fletcher was appointed in command of the battleship New Mexico in the rank of captain. By 1939, he was a rear admiral. In September of that year, Fletcher was sent to the Pacific in command of Cruiser Division Three with his Flag flying in Concord, and later 4storia in which he was embarked during the Pearl Harbor attack. After commanding the unsuccessful expedition to relieve US forces striving to retain American possession of Wake Island in December 1941, Fletcher's command was reorganised as Task Force 17 with his Flag flying from the aircraft carrier Yorktown. In February, Fletcher's ships raided both the Gilbert and Marshall Island groups and this was followed by raids on Japanese positions in New Guinea in March. His command further expanded, Fletcher's title became Commander Cruisers Pacific Fleet in April 1942. However, it was as Commander of Task Force 17 that Fletcher participated in the Coral Sea Battle.

On the morning of 4 May, Task Force 17, consisting of the American carrier Yorktown, heavy cruisers 4storia, Chester and Portland, and six destroyers, were within 100 miles of the Japanese invasion force when planes from Yorktown attacked Tulagi and Cavutu Harbour. One Japanese destroyer was sunk and another badly damaged. Five enemy landing craft were sent to the bottom, a minelayer was damaged and several aircraft were shot down.

During 5-6 May, Allied ships commenced refuelling from the Fleet Tanker USS Neosho in preparation for another engagement. This was discontinued on 6 May when news of an advancing Japanese naval force was received. The Allied ships were then reorganised into three groups: an Attack Group, a Support Group, which included HMA Ships Australia and Hobart, and an Air Group based around the carriers Yorktown and Lexington.

The Support Group was under the command of Rear Admiral John Crace, RACAS. John Crace was horn on a rural property near Queanbeyan, New South Wales. He left for England in 1899 and joined the Royal Navy in 1902. The RAN had yet to he established. After graduating from HMS Britannia in 1903, Crace spent the next three years under training in the cruiser Good Hope before returning ashore for further professional courses. In 1908, he was appointed to the Flagship of the Australia Station, HMS Powerjul, in which he was to spend the next three years, and soon after promoted lieutenant. After returning to Britain, Crace specialised in torpedo warfare and was later posted to the battlecruiser HMAS,4ustralia, the Flagship of the newly created RAN, which was fitting out in Scotland. Crace remained in 4ustralia until early 1917 when he was given a shore staff posting which was followed by service in the newly commissioned hattlecruiser HMS Hood. Promoted to commander in late 1920, Crace later served as executive officer of the light cruiser HMS Danae.

Crace's first command was the destroyer k'alhalla during 1929-30. In 1934, he was appointed to his second command, the cruiser Emerald, which was preparing to join the East Indies Station. After serving at the Admiralty from 1937 to 1939 as Assistant to the Second Sea Lord, Crace was promoted rear admiral and appointed in command of the Australian Squadron. Although a Royal Navy officer seconded to the RAN, Crace's Australian origins made his appointment a popular one.' Although he welcomed his appointment to Australian Squadron, Crace found that the ships of his command were dispersed throughout a number of theatres of war, and that his ability to command was subject to a range of factors that he had not anticipated. However, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the creation of a Pacific Theatre presented Crace and the Australian Squadron with an enormous challenge.

As mentioned earlier, on 12 February 1942, Allied naval forces in the South West Pacific were formed into the Anzac Squadron based at Suva in Fiji. The Squadron consisted of Crace's Flagship, 4ustralia, the New Zealand cruisers 4chilles and Leander, USS Chicago and two American destroyers. Crace commanded the Squadron while it supported American carrier raids across New Guinea to Rabaul until its re-designation as Task Force 44 in April 1942. When the Allies prepared to engage the approaching Japanese in the Coral Sea, Crace was given command of Task Group 17.3 - the Support Force - for the duration of operations in the Coral Sea.

On the morning of 7 May, the Attack Group located (by scout aircraft) a large Japanese force based around three carriers which appeared bound for Port Moresby. When 92 planes from the American carriers were launched they succeeded in destroying the Japanese carrier Shoho. In response, Japanese carrier aircraft from Zuikaku and Shokaku attacked and sank the tanker Neosho and the destroyer Sims, the former being mistaken for an American light carrier, which had been detached to the south.

A lull in the action followed while each carrier force tried to locate the other. There were several aerial clashes but neither side's carrier aircraft could locate the surface forces. In the early morning of 7 May, Japanese land-based air forces concentrated their efforts on the Allied Support Force, commanded by Admiral Crace and deployed to intercept the Port Moresby Invasion Force in the jomard Passage. Three Japanese bombing and torpedo attacks were sustained by Crace's force, attacks which would otherwise have been mounted on the.more highly valued Allied carrier force. The Japanese operational plan was in disarray by the end of 7 May. Having received reports of Crace's force and the existence of two carrier battle groups in the Coral Sea, Admiral Inouye ordered the Port Moresby Invasion Group to turn back from the Jomard Passage Until the American carrier strength had been neutralised. Japanese emphasis was now turned to finding and destroying the American carriers.

Early the next morning (8 May), air patrols from both sides simultaneously located the surface forces and the battle reached its crucial stage. Allied planes mounted a fierce attack on the carrier Shokaku and inflicted severe damage while Lexington was abandoned after large leakages of aviation fuel put her in immediate danger of explosion. The Japanese had lost considerably more carrier fighter aircraft and Inouye was unwilling to risk his carriers further. He was also unwilling to send the Invasion Force through the Jomard Passage in the face of Crace's force and the likelihood of attack from Allied land-based aircraft.

As a result of the heavy losses sustained by both sides, the Allies and the Japanese withdrew the major part of their forces. The Invasion Force, having returned to Rabaul, and Shoho sunk, Shokaku damaged, and Zuikaku withdrawn to the south, Yamamoto was left with no choice but to confirm lnouye's effective cancellation of Operation 'MO' Had Yamamoto ordered the Invasion Force to turn again towards Port Moresby, it would have stood a very good chance of reaching Port Moresby. With Lexington sunk and Yorktown bound for Noumea, the likely Allied air resistance would have been a fraction of that expected on 6 May. However, Yamamoto had received orders on 5 May that Operation 'MI' was to proceed as planned and set about preparing for the most decisive engagement of the Pacific War.

The Battle of the Coral Sea had three distinct results. First, it was a tactical victory as naval air power and carrier warfare emerged as the key to future Allied success. The virtual loss of the two big carriers at the Coral Sea battle weakened the Japanese at Midway less than one month later. Here they lost four carriers and, effectively, the Pacific naval war. The 'breathing space' created by Coral Sea also meant that the US Navy was able to deploy Hornet and Enterprise to the Central Pacific after their return from the raid on Japan in the Northern Pacific.

Second, it was a strategic victory in that Japan was forced to fight a land campaign in New Guinea, which highlighted the poor support they were able to provide to their troops so far from home. Plans for invading Fiji, Samoa and New Caledonia were shelved and the sea route to the north of Australia remained open to the Allies.

And third, the success at Coral Sea was an overwhelming psychological victory. For the first time in six months, the Japanese had been stopped - and stopped where they least expected - at sea. The German Naval Attache in Tokyo, Admiral Wenneker, stated that: 'In all the war, the greatest single shock to the Japanese was their defeat in the Battle of the Coral Sea 
Because they had been confident that they would completely conquer Australia by the end of 1942' The Americans also saw Coral Sea as a psychological success, as official historian Samuel'Morison later recorded. 'There is no greater teacher of combat that can even remotely approach the value of combat itself; call Coral Sea what you will, it was an indispensable preliminary to the great victory of Midway. The morale value of the battle to all Allied nations, coming as it did immediately after the surrender of Corregidor, was immeasurable.'

At the Going Down of the Sun
And In the Morning
We Shall Remember Them
LEST WE FORGET

Mike Deegan.
